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THE THFfIS_ 
Steven Starker 
Various researchers have noted that emotions expressed in dream 
reports are infrequent and, more often, unpleasant. These observations 
are ambiguous for several reasons: (1) Empirical opinions differ 
markedly with regard to the structure of mentation across the continuum 
of waking and sleeping experience. (2) While the waking state is 
usually assumed as an implicit baseline, few studies hpve quantitatively 
compared waking and dream emotions. (3) Dream researchers have rtot 
thought about the basic nature of emotions or certain constraints which 
sleep physiology might impose upon emotions. In light of these asser~ 
tions and considerations, an intrasubject comparison of emotions in 
reports of waking experiences and dreams might seem worthwhile. 
In this study nine female university students wrote about their 
waking experiences for the four hour period prior to going to sleep 
during a two week period. On alternate mornings, these subjects either 
redescribed the prior evening's events or described any dreams they 
remembered. The procedures and formats for the evening and morning 
reports were as nearly equivalent as practical considerations allow. 
Two judges scored all reports for five classes of emotions 
defined by Hall and Van de Castle (1966). Interrater agreement was 
weak. The respective judges seemed to employ more or less stringent 
standards in identifying emotions. This fact notwithstanding, the 
ultimate findings, based on each judge's independent scores, point to 
the same conclusion. 
The results seem to contradict assertions that dreams exhibit 
fewer or more dysphoric emotions. Overall, reports of waking 
experiences and dreams contained the same frequencies and qualities 
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of emotions. While this describes the bulk of the findings, there is a 
suggestion that reports from certain individuals may exhibit different 
emotions in reports of the two states. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Various researchers have observed that dream reports expressed 
fewer emotions {Calkins, 1893; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Snyder, 1970; 
Hartshorn, Corriere, Karle, Switzer, Hart, Gold, & Binder, 1977) and 
more unpleasant emotions (Calkins, 1893; Weed & Hallam, 1896; Bentley, 
1915; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Snyder, 1970; Kramer, Winget, & 
Whitman, 1971) than they expected. These observations might imply that 
dream reports contain less emotions and more dysphoric emotions than 
would reports of waking experiences. However, the studies cited did not 
evaluate waking reports. 
In this project five classes of emotions were scored for similar 
reports of dreams and waking experiences, and these measures were 
compared to see if they are different. In general, the results are 
inconsistent with the implications suggested above. 
As pref ace to describing the present research, the relationship 
between dreams and waking experience and some relevant additional 
empirical findings about dreaming and waking emotions are discussed. 
Theories of emotions and certain constraints which sleep physiology 
might impose on dream emotions are considered. Finally, methodological 
issues are identified. 
CHAPTER II 
THE COMPARISON OF DREAMS AND WAKING EXPERIENCE 
ASSUMPTION OF WAKING EXPERIENCE AS A BASELINE 
The assumption of waking experience as "given" and as a baseline 
against which to compare dreams influences conceptualization of dreams 
and probably dream research. In this perspective, memories from sleep 
may be described as more bizarre, hallucinatory, symbolic, and less 
rational than waking experiences. The reasoning behind this assumption 
is usually tacit and merits examination. Maybe we employ wakeful 
experience as a baseline because it seems more "normal," is more easily 
remembered (see Domhoff, 1969; Cohen, 1974), or we feel that we under-
stand it better. It could be that we do not use sleeping experience 
as a baseline because we almost always make comparisons of the two 
states when we are awake; were we to evaluate waking experience when 
asleep, that state might seem the more normal. In any event a point 
made by Foulkes and Fleisher (1975) is critical: 
[The] baseline properties of waking thought can no longer 
be assumed in studies of sleep mentation. Rather they must 
be independently studied with techniques comparable to those 
used in sleep studies. (p. 74) 
The present study attempted to honor this requirement. 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WAKING AND SLEEPING EXPERIENCE 
The relationship between waking and sleeping experience has 
received extensive empirical and theoretical attention. The 
following selections highlight some predominant thinking in this 
area. 
[Cartwright (1969) maintains] most current dream theory can 
be clustered into one of two positions: the Freudian and 
Alderian. The Freudian view sees the dream as providing dis-
guised gratification of individual wishes which are denied 
awareness during wakefulness. In the Alderian view, dreams seem 
to be motivated by the need for a solution to current emotional 
problems from our waking life and conscious experience. These 
two imply opposite types of relationships between dreaming and 
the conscious waking behavior which precedes it: the first 
implies a compensatory, the second a continuity relationship. 
(pp. 366-36 7) 
Schwartz, Weinstein, and Arkin (1978) debate the positions 
assigned by Cartwright to the various theoretical schools. Never-
theless, the degree to which sleeping mentation is or is not 
continuous with waking mentation, while categorized or articulated 
differently by many authors (e.g., Foulkes, 1962; Tomkins, 1962; 
Singer, 1966; Beck, 1969; Starker, 197~; Schwartz et al., 1978; 
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Vogel, 1978), seems to be a recognized and reasonable point of departure 
in describing and perhaps better understanding the nature of dreams. 
Beck (1969) reorganized "the assumptions underlying contemporary 
dream theories" (p. 373) into (1) a continuity-discontinuity position, 
(2) a functional position where dreams fulfill wishes (Freud) or solve 
problems (Adler, French, Hall, & Fromm), and (3) a category where dreams 
serve no function. Under his functional proposition, Beck describes a 
"congenitive model of dreams" (p. 375) where idiosyncratic cognitive 
patterns are activated during waking experience and influence an 
individual's interpretation of reality. When the patient is 
asleep and external stimuli are absent, the schemata (patterns) 
exert a maximum influence on the thinking, as manifest in the 
thematic content of dreams • • . . [This model] not only 
bridges the gap between sleeping mentation and waking mentation 
but remains clear of the teleological overtones contained in 
the theory that dreams serve as a guardian of sleep or solve 
problems. (pp. 375-376) 
While Beck may or may not ascribe some esoteric operant function to 
dreaming, his is a continuity position in viewing mentation as a 
relatively constant structure across time, waking and sleeping, for a 
given individual. 
Schwartz et al. (1978) discuss and expand on Cartwright's and 
Beck's presentations. They feel that 
the assumptions of contemporary dream theory are best presented 
in terms of two categories • • • the Function-of-Dreaming 
Category [in which ] dreams play a role in adaptational pro-
cesses • • • [such as coping or problem solving, information 
processing] ••• development, regulation and/or maintenance of 
cognitive, self, or ego systems [and sleep preservation, or 
that dreams serve no function but are only] the expression of 
psychic activity during sleep. (pp. 222, 223) 
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Schwartz et al. cite various authors who subscribe to their "Adaptational 
processes" functions. Their second category is "The Continuity-
Discontinuity-between-Dreaming-and-Wakeful-Mentation Category" (p. 223). 
In response to Cartwright's con.tent ion that the discontinuity position 
is represented in the Freudian view, Schwartz et al. cite Freud (1960) 
to contend 
that Freud's model of dream formation quite nicely allows for 
both continuity and discontinuity between dreams and wakeful 
mentation as well as manifest-dream events which deal with 
problem solving, coping, and adaptation. (p. 223) 
In a nutshell, Freud recognized a "'secondary' function of dreams," 
not considered in "dream-interpretation," which includes 
thinking ahead, forming intentions, framing attempted solu-
tions which may perhaps be realized later in waking life, 
all these, and many other similar things, are products of 
the unconscious and preconscious activity of the mind; they 
may persist in the state of sleep as "the day's residues" and 
combine with an unconscious wish • • • in forming a dream. 
(Freud, 1960, pp. 618-619) 
As I read it, this secondary function may reflect an onging or 
continuous process while, at the same time, the unconscious wish 
with which it combines may represent a distinct, discontinuous element. 
Schwartz et al. conclude, however, that verification of the Freudian 
position is "well nigh impossible" (p. 224). 
In examining the .relationship between daydreaming and nocturnal 
dreaming, Starker (1974) describes three models: (1) alternative 
channels, (2) analagous or parallel processes, and (3) independent 
processes. Tomkins (1962) and Singer (1966) have also described· 
analagous, parallel, or continuum positions. The independent processes 
argument is sunnnarized well by Vogel (1978). Many studies specifically 
address the relationship between waking and sleeping fantasy, but the 
various paradigms might be extended to other comparisons of the waking 
and sleeping states. 
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While different arguments emphasize continuous, discontinuous, or 
functional elements, some basic concepts seem to prevail: (1) Dreaming 
and waking mentation are seen as similar if not identical; or (2) each 
state exhibits functions which are, for unknown reasons, either impossible, 
inoperative, or operate differently in the other. In the latter case, 
dreaming may or may not somehow counterbalance waking mentation. 
The consciounsness continuum is not easily fragmented. So called 
continuous, discontinuous, and functional events are not discreet. 
Foulkes (1962) points out that "mental activity is always present 
in the sleeping human" (p. 24). Cartwright (1969) maintains that 
such activity is pursued differently under different states. 
Cohen (1974) refers to 
evidence that to a certain extent adaptive personal functioning 
continues during sleep· and is represented in dream content 
(Bonime, 1962; Breger, 1967; Cohen, 1973 b; Dewan, 1969; Hall, 
1966; Shulman, 1969). (p. 138) 
In short, while the various continuity, compensatory, and functional 
constructs can prove heuristically useful, they may make complex, 
multifaceted functions seem unidimensional. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH ON EMOTIONS IN DREAM REPORTS 
Certain findings have been interpreted to support contentions 
that (1) emotions are infrequent and more often dysphoric in dreams, 
(2) dreams vent emotions, or (3) dream emotions are no different 
than waking emotions. Research methods may well influence these 
seemingly different conclusions. This chapter describes some studies 
which support the three contrasting views and considers some relevant 
methodological issues in light of four more recent investigations. 
DREAMS EXPRESS FEWER AND MORE UNPLEASANT EMOTIONS 
As previously noted, Calkins (1893), Hall and Van de Castle (1966), 
Snyder (1970), and Hartshorn, et al. (1977) noted a paucity of incidence 
while Calkins (1893), Weed and Hallam (1896), Bentley (1915), Hall and 
Van de Castle (1966), Snyder (1970), and Kramer, et al. (1971) saw a 
dysphoric tone in the apparent emotions of dream reports. The following 
section describes three of these studies. 
Hall and Van de Castle (1966) developed a system for classifying 
and scoring eight variables from written dream protocols. They found 
that "the classification of emotions was one of our most difficult tasks" 
(p. 110). Furthermore: 
When a scorer goes over dream reports he is generally sur-
prised at how few emotions are actually reported, unless the 
dreamer is specifically and strongly urged to state what 
emotions he experienced during the dream. Situations that 
would undoubtedly be terrifying or depressing for the average 
individual may be reported in some detail, but a description 
of their emotional impact upon the dreamer is of ten curiously 
lacking. (p. 110) 
They also note that "good fortunes are rather rare in dreams" (p. 106); 
and when emotions are identified by the dreamer, "negative emotions, 
i.e., sad, angry, confused, and apprehensive, predominate over happi-
ness" (p. 193). 
Snyder (1970) studied verbal reports from REM awakenings. He 
points out that most researchers agree dreaming has an emotional 
dimension and cites Weed and Hallam (1896) and Bentley (1915) who 
found unpleasant emotions almost twice as often as pleasant ones in 
their dream data. Then, in a tone strikingly reminiscent of Hall and 
Van de Castle's, Snyder succinctly summarizes some of the problems 
encountered when evaluating emotions in dream reports: 
On the other hand, Calkins [1893] found it especially diffi-
cult to define the prevailing emotions of her reports and 
attempted to do so in only about 16 percent which were almost 
entirely unpleasant. Our impression is much more similar to 
Calkins, since I am particularly unsatisfied with our ability 
to assess the emotional dimension of our dream descriptions. 
It did not seem difficult at first, for unwittingly we were 
frequently inf errring what would have been the appropriate 
emotion under the circumstances described. Then we began to 
encounter reports in which the subject emphatically disavowed 
any such feelings. For instance, a waiter in a restaurant was 
making erotic advances to the dreamer's sister, resulting in 
a fist fight; but he specifically denied any accompanying feel-
ings of anger. The fight just seemed like a necessary social 
amenity. After a few such instances we started all over again, 
tabulating emotions only when they were definitely identified 
by the reporter, and none were identified in more than two-
thirds of the narratives. Even in Group B, where emotions had 
been the subject of special interest, the incidence was only 
35 percent. 
Of the emotions which were clearly mentioned, unpleasant 
categories predominated by a ratio of more than two to one, 
fear or anxiety being the most common category and anger next. 
Overall, the affect most frequently mentioned was neither 
pleasant nor unpleasant, but that of diffuse excitement. 
(p. 141, my italics) 
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Employing a "Process Scoring System" (Corriere, Hart, Karle, 
Binder, Bold, & Waldenberg, 1977) to evaluate impacts of "Feeling 
Therapy" (Hart, Corriere, & Binder, 1975) on dream diaries, Hartshorn, 
Corriere, Karle, Switzer, Hart, Gold, and Binder (1977) found: 
[Five experienced Feeling Therapy patients] evidenced more 
feeling intensity in their dreams. In fact none of the 
patient dreams were rated "no feeling," while every non-
therapy S [five undergraduate college students] reported at 
least one. While expression level was fairly low on the 
average for the patient group (1.90), it was still much 
higher than that found among the control group (1.90), who 
showed almost no expression of feeling whatsoever in their 
dreams • • • 
It should be pointed out that we originally expected 
higher scores on all four process scales for the patient 
group. We expected more feeling, expression, activity, and 
clarity in their dreams than we found. (pp. 845-846, my 
italics) 
These data and observations with respect to the frequency of emotions 
in dream reports, especially for the control group, seem remarkably 
consistent with the gist of Hall and Van de Castle's and Snyder's 
findings. 
Jones (1970) has suggested that the "increase in dream recall 
ability under laboratory [as opposed to home] conditions" (p. 45) may 
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allow the individual investigator to "rule out this tendency toward the 
prosaic or rule it in, more or less at will" (p. 45) depending on how 
the dream protocols are collected. In this light, it is worth noting 
that the studies referred to include instances of both diary and sleep 
awakening procedures. 
The hazards inherent in comparing nonequivalent data are legion, 
and the focus and structures of these studies are quite different. 
Nevertheless, two persistent findings emerge: (1) Unprompted dream 
reports, from both diaries and REM awakenings, exhibit a dearth in 
measured frequencies of apparent emotions; and (2) when emotions are 
articulated by dreamers, those defined by researchers as "unpleasant" 
or "negative" predominate over those defined as "pleasant." 
If waking and dreaming experiences are essentially "continuous," 
the implication of these findings for waking experience might prove 
instructive--if not disconcerting. 
DREAMS VENT EMOTIONS 
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Conclusions by other authors seem inconsistent with the studies 
just described. Corriere et al. (1977) and Fisher and Greenberg (1977) 
see dreams as vehicles for the venting of feelings. Corrier's et al. 
model maintains that "dreams are pictures of feelings" {p. 807). This 
position is described as being "in contrast to Freud's analytic theory" 
(p. 870). Fisher and Greenberg found support for the notion that "one 
function of dreaming thought appears to be to explore the emotional 
components of a tension area which may be different from those available 
to the waking self" (p. 54). Interestingly enough, they report that 
various research findings are "compatible with Freud's central concept 
of dreaming, namely, that it offers an outlet or release for internal 
(unconscious) tension" (p. 62). This assertion is hedged, however, 
with the usual caveat that it remains to be definitively demonstrated. 
DREAM EMOTIONS PARALLEL WAKING EMOTIONS 
The studies by Corriere et al. (1977) and Hartshorn et al. (1977) 
also suggest that some characteristics of dream emotions are consistent 
with the continuum model of waking versus sleeping mentation framework. 
Corriere et al. report preliminary support for a "parallelism hypo-
thesis, which holds that expression of affect in dreams parallels the 
expression of affect in waking" {p. 807), but point out that "only 
multidimensional data on both waking and dreaming life can provide a 
definitive understanding of dream processes" (p. 819). Hartshorn's 
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et al. data were also interpreted to support the parallelism hypothesis, 
but here again the character of the waking component is only inferential 
and not systematically evaluated for comparison with sleep reports. 
To recapitulate, the studies reviewed so far suggest that 
(1) emotions in dream reports are infrequent and often unpleasant, 
(2) dreams are an outlet for emotions, or (3) dream emotions parallel 
waking emotions. If emotions from dreams and waking experiences were 
compared, results supporting these three conclusions would seem to 
cover the entire continuity-discontinuity spectrum. 
FOUR RECENT STUDIES: FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Four studies (Snyder, 1970; Kramer, Winget & Whitman, 1971; 
Kroon, 1972; Stairs & Blick, 1979) afford more specific data about emo-
tions in dream reports. Each incorporates procedural elements which, as 
with any study, are probably reflected in its findings. Nevertheless, 
collectively they may serve to summarize more recent findings and high-
light certain methodological factors which are relevant. 
Snyder (1970) observes that "the feelings expressed in dreams are 
usually bland and rather nebulous, attracting attention only when they 
become unpleasant; perhaps that's the way life is" (p. 142). Perhaps? 
There are two puzzling aspects to this study which Snyder 
describes "as a preliminary reconnaissance of how the state of 
consciousness described by REM awakening reports compares with waking 
consciousness" (p. 127). He defines dreaming by 
two minimal criteria: first, that the subject's words must 
clearly convey an experience of complex and organized per-
ceptual imagery. In practice we find that when this criterion 
is met, the imagery reported is always partially visual. The 
second criterion is that this imagery must have undergone 
some temporal progression or change. We didn't accept tableaus, 
only dramas. (p. 129) 
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Then, having evaluated 635 laboratory dreams, Snyder concludes that "the 
broadest generalization I can make about our observations of dreaming 
consciousness is that it is a remarkably faithful replica of waking 
life" (p. 133). A "typical dream" involves people in every-day settings 
doing ordinary things with other people. Snyder describes these findings 
as consistent with Hall's (1966) and Calkins' (1893). 
Now for the two problems: (1) The ultimate findings seem pre-
determined, to a large degree, by the definition of dreaming; and (2) 
while dream reports were evaluated in a rigorous fashion, waking 
experience was determined strictly by the "seat-of-the-pants," if you 
will. Is it really much of a surprise that when dreaming is defined 
as "an experience of complex and organized perceptual imagery" dreams 
involve people in "every-day settings doing ordinary things with other 
people"? More troublesome,Jhowever, is the assertion that this study 
"compares" REM awakening reports "with waking consciousness" (p. 127) 
when, in fact, waking consciousness was not empirically assessed. It 
was purely a matter of subjective opinion. This is evident in the 
suggestion that "perhaps that's the way life is." In a different con-
text, Snyder properly maintains that "private convictions are of no more 
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scientific value than the private dream memories from which they derive" 
(Kramer, Whitman, Baldridge, & Ornstein, Eds., 1969, p. 18). This 
applies to private convictions about waking life as well. 
Hall and Van de Castle (1966) and others (Kramer et al., 1971; 
Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975; Corriere et al., 1977; Cartwright, 1978) 
have pointed out that if waking and dreaming experience are to be 
meaningfully compared, both states must be evaluated, and these 
evaluations must be as nearly equivalent as possible. The present 
study attempted to make such a comparison for five classes of emotions. 
Kramer et al. (1971) had 300 adults fill out dream survey 
questionnaires wherein each described his or her "most recent dream 
and his [or her] earliest memory" (p. 1350). All protocols were 
evaluated according to Hall and Van de Castle's (1966) scales. They 
found that both dream and memory report;s contained "more negative 
event outcomes than positive ones, i.e., more failure and misfortune 
than success and good fortune" (pp. 1351-1352). Sixteen percent of 
dream reports and 12 percent of early memory reports contained 
scorable emotions. "Dysphoric emotions were much more common than 
pleasant ones in both verbal reports" (p. 1352, my italics). Comparing 
their dream sample to Hall and Van de Castle's (1966) norms, Kramer, 
et al. state that the "striking feature which emerges is how similar 
the dream content of the two samples turns out to be" (p. 1353). 
"Several content differences" were observed, however, when early memory 
and most recent dream scores were compared. Early memory scores indi-
cated more misfortune to the respondent, fewer with no setting, more 
castration anxiety and oral incorporation "making them more like what 
Hall and Van de Castle report in their dream content norms" (p. 1353). 
They conclude that 
differences do occur between dream reports and early memories 
based on an analysis of our data with the Hall and Van de Castle 
scales, which indicate that different aspects of the respondent's 
experience are being reflected in the two verbal products. 
(p. 1353) 
When scored according to the Gottschalk-Gleser Verbal· Sample Scales 
(Gottschalk & Gleser, 1969; Gottschalk, Winget, & Gleser, 1969) the 
results indicated 
that total anxiety was more frequent than total hostility in both 
dream reports and early memories and that total anxiety and total 
hostility were found more often in the dream reports than the 
early memory. (p. 1353) 
When affect was rated as pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral, "dream 
reports even more than early memories, reflect unpleasant experience" 
(p. 1354). Kramer et al. conclude that the "dream report is indeed 
revealing of different aspects of an individual's inner concerns than 
other verbal products such as early memories" (p. 1356) and speculate 
that this difference might reflect the temporal difference between 
the report and the reported event for the two cases. 
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Kramer's et al. procedure is a step in the right direction because 
both waking experience and dream reports were evaluated. The time 
difference variable for the reported events could be controlled to 
some degree.if subjects were to describe experiences for a given day 
and dreams from the ensuing night. The present study incorporates such 
control. 
Consonant with this premise, Kroon (1973) had four subjects 
"record all their recalled dreams as well as their significant inter-
actions while pursuing normal daily activities" (p. 417-B} and 
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compared the "longitudinal relationship between affect in response to 
people in daily interaction and to dream characters" (pp. 416-B-417-B). 
Each interaction was summarized by the subject and rated on an eight 
point scale for "seven bi-polar emotional dimensions" (p. 417-B). The 
overall findings are described as 
supporting the idea of continuity of waking and dream experiences 
over a period of time • • • but dream affect was consistently 
less positive than waking affect, with the greatest waking-
dream difference in emotional dimensions measuring hedonic level, 
followed by those measuring feelings of closeness to other 
people and self-esteem. Negative feelings tended to emerge 
only in dreams in the Calm vs. Tense and Close to Other People 
vs. Alone and Distant from Other People dimensions • • • • 
Two S's rated more dreams as "pleasant" and two S's rated dreams 
as "unpleasant." (p. 417-B) 
This mixed bag might be interpreted in part to confirm the notion of a 
mostly dysphoric-tone in dream affect. Kroon found that "variations 
of affect along individual dimension~'(p. 417-B) were not common 
across subjects, but "were conguent with each S's individual life 
context" {p. 417-B). Also, correlations suggested "long-term affective 
continuity in waking and dream experience" (p. 417-B). 
Kroon's design incorporates a source of potential bias in 
requiring subjects to rate emotions. Cohen (1974), referring to 
numerous studies, contends "that questionnaire and diary measures of 
dream recall frequency produce results that are closely related and 
highly predictive of laboratory recall" (p. 139). Nevertheless, in 
light of Hall and Van de Castle's,.Snyder's, and Hartshorn's et al. 
observations that subjects often fail to describe emotions in 
unprompted dream reports and suggestions that waking and sleeping 
experiences may or may not be continuous, an important question 
arises: Are subjects equally reticent to volunteer emotions in 
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unprompted reports of waking experience. In order to answer this 
question, both report formats must be as nearly equivalent and as free 
from hints regarding the experimenter's interests and expectations as 
possible. One approach to this end, employed in the present study, might 
be a night-day report process which is as unstructured and "open-ended" 
as experimental demands allow. This study attempted to employ such a 
procedure. 
Stairs and Blick (1979) tried "to solve some of the problems that 
are associated with research involving the emotional content of dreams" 
(p. 839). Thirteen male and 18 female students recorded five dreams 
each in dream diaries over a five-week period. "To circumvent the 
problem concerning the lack of reported emotions" (p. 839), the experi-
menters presented subjects with "a forced-choice situation in which 
they had to pick the two strongest emotions that appeared in each dream" 
(p. 839). The 10 selections offered included nine from Izard (1972) 
and an "other" class. They found 77 percent of emotions included in 
the classes of Interest-Excitement, 18 percent; Fear-Terror, 17 percent; 
Surprise-Startle, 16 percent; Enjoyment-Joy, 15 percent; Distress-
Anguish, 11 percent, while 23 percent comprised Other, 7 percent; 
Anger-Rage, 6 percent; Shame-Humiliation, 5 percent; Disgust-Revulsion, 
4 percent; and Contempt-Scorn, 1 percent. These data are construed as 
supporting Snyder's contention that· about "one-third of the dreamer's 
emotions were associated with fear and anxiety" (p. 842). 
Stairs and Blick could not directly compare their data with Hall 
and Van de Castle's (1966) norms because in their study dreamers scored 
their own dreams and twice as many classes of emotions were used. Never-
theless, in contrast to Hall and Van de Castle, they found "no 
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significant differences in dream emotions for men and women" (p. 842). 
They also question Hall and Van de Castle's contention that "negative 
emotions of sadness, anger, confusion, and apprehension predominate 
over the positive emotions of happiness" (p. 842), pointing out that in 
their data, of the five most frequent emotions (77 percent) "only two 
were unquestionably negative, fear and distress [while] anger, shame, 
disgust, and contempt each account for 6 percent or less of all dream 
emotions" (p. 842). Concluding this line of reasoning, Stairs and 
Blick reach "a guarded conclusion • • . that maybe dreams have more 
positive emotions than had previously been thought" (p. 842). 
Conclusions drawn from comparisons between studies, and indeed 
within a given study are, of course, critically determined by respec-
tive definitions of variables and by how the resultant data are 
conceptualized. For example, one might subjectively categorize Stairs 
and Blick's data as (1) affectively positive: Interest-Excitement, 
18 percent; Enjoyment-Joy, 15 percent, (2) affectively neutral: 
Surprise-Startle, 16 percent; other, 7 percent, and (3) affectively 
negative: Fear-Terror, 17 percent; Distress-Anguish, 11 percent; 
Anger-Rage, 6 percent; Shame-Humiliation, 5 percent; Disgust-Revulsion, 
4 percent; Contempt-Scorn, 1 percent. Grouped in this fashion, the 
overall proportions become: positive, 33 percent; neutral, 23 
percent; negative 44 percent. These data may be seen as more consis-
tent with findings which conclude dream emotions are more negative than 
positive. There are, of course, countless variations on this theme 
making speculation just that. This does not, of course, detract from 
the merit of the study. 
It is worth noting that, like Snyder, Stairs and Blick did not 
measure waking mentation; but unlike Snyder, they never professed to. 
If one of the problems which they set out to solve was an apparent 
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"lack of reported emotions'~ in dream reports, they may have failed. 
Circumvention goes around a problem. It can provide important findings, 
but the circumvented problem may remain. 
To summarize from the four preceding studies, three describe dream 
emotions as predominantly negative, unpleasant, or less positive than 
emotions from waking experience. This is consistent with the findings 
noted earlier. Stairs and Blick alone make a "guarded conclusion" that 
dreams may be more affectively positive than formerly thought. The two 
studies which did not focus subject's attention on the dependent 
variable found a paucity of emotions in dream reports. All except 
Stairs and Blick, who did not address the issue, report some degree 
of overall support for the notion of continuity between waking and dream-
ing experience. However, the two studies (Kramer et al., 1971; Kroon, 
1973) which actually measured and compared emotions from both waking 
and dream reports found that dream reports exhibit more total anxiety, 
total hostility, and unpleasant experiences, and were consistently less 
positive in affect than waking reports. In an observation reminiscent 
of Vogel's (1978) independent processes model, and surprisingly similar 
to Fisher and Greenberg's (1977) suggestion, Kramer et al. go so far 
as to state that their data "indicate that different aspects of the 
respondent's experience are being reflected in the two verbal products" 
(p. 1353). 
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These various results suggest that emotions in dream reports 
may indeed be, if not discontinuous, at least different from emotions 
in reports of waking experience. At the same time, manifest dream 
reports seem to exhibit a structural continuity with reports of waking 
experience which is consistent with idiographic personality variables. 
In other words, the relationship between the two states is probably not 
of the Jekyll-Hyde variety. Within this framework, however, there is 
extensive evidence that emotions from dream reports are more unpleasant 
than emotions from reports of waking experience. 
Certain procedural factors seem critical to J proper comparison 
of waking and dream reports: (1) Reports of experiences from both the 
waking and dreaming states must be secured under conditions as nearly 
equivalent as possible. (2) Report formats should be identical and 
derived from a relatively brief, contiguous time frame. (3) Subjects 
must have a minimum of prompts regarding the primary dependent variables, 
i.e., emotions. (4) All reports should be randomly assembled and rated 
using the same instrument. (5) Raters must have as few clues as possible 
regarding the independent variable state, i.e., waking or dreaming, 
reflected in any report, and (6) interrater reliability must be assessed. 
While the four studies just considered may afford valid data and useful 
findings, none fulfills all of these criteria. This project, while 
incorporating its own flaws, attempted to honor these requirements. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMOTIONS IN DREAHS 
THEORIES OF ENOTIONS 
What are emotions anyway? This question has been consistently 
ignored by researchers and theorists interested in dream emotions. 
Plutchik (1970) describes "three major traditions concerned 
with the nature of emotions" (p. 3). The evolutionary or Darwinian 
model sees "emotional expression in lower animals and in man" (p. 3) 
as continuous. This model emphasizes the "expressive and behavioral 
aspects of emotion" (p. 4). William James' position that "bodily 
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, our feel-
ings of the same changes as they occur is the emotion" (James & Lange, 
1922, p. 11) was discounted by Cannon (1929) because certain known 
"visceral" characteristics are incompatible with the model (see Schachter 
in Arnold, Ed., 1970, p. 115). The third major tradition in emotional 
theory which Plutchik refers to is the Freudian model wherein "'archaic 
discharge syndromes' ..• are part of the biological inheritance of man" 
(p. 4). 
Plutchik also describes "cognitive aspects" of emotion wherein an 
organism evaluates "its environment" (Arnold, 1960). Plutchik maintains 
"that an evaluation of a perception is not an emotion. Evaluations are 
only part of a total process which involves an organism interacting with 
its environment in biologically adaptive ways" (p. 9). Arnoldts (1969) 
analysis and definition of emotion, which will be reviewed presently, 
is much broader than this critique implies. Arnold describes emotion 
not as "an evaluation of a perception" but as a "felt tendency" to 
act which is integral to the perception-appraisal-action complex, but 
this is getting ahead of the story. 
[Plutchik defines] an emotion as a patterned bodily reaction of 
either protection, destruction, reproduction, deprivation, 
incorporation, rejection, exploration or orientation, or some 
combination of these, which is brought about by a stimulus. 
(p. 12) 
Based on this definition, one might wonder about the nature of dream 
emotions if bodily reactions require voluntary components and stimuli 
are extrinsic to the dreamer. Some implications from these premises 
will be explored presently. 
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Arnold's (1960) evaluation of Emotion and Personality is relevant 
to a consideration of dream emotions. In Volume I: Psychological 
Aspects, subjective impression and empirical findings are carefully 
synthesized in a description and concise definition (p. 182) of emotion. 
Volume II recounts the Neurological and Physiological Aspects which 
predicate Volume I. 
Arnold's discussion of Freud's thoughts about emotions is 
instructive. She maintains that Freud's primary interest was not in 
emotions per se but in "personality and its disturbances" (p. 133). 
In this context, however, he "found that emotional difficulties •.• 
played a far greater role than purposive activity" (p. 133). Before 
1900 Freud held that the instincts of love and aggression carried "an 
'affective charge' which is the psychic counterpart of instinctual 
energy" (p. 136). The discharge of this energy "is experienced as 
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emotion or affect (discharge theory of affect)" (p. 136). One problem 
with this position was that "no pleasure should be experienced until 
the instinctual aim is reached" (p. 136). Recognizing this, Freud's 
followers "suggested that emotions represent increasing or decreasing 
excitation rather than sheer discharge of the drive" (p. 136). After 
about 1900 Freud saw "emotion as the experience of autonomic excitation 
induced by ideas in the unconscious" (p. 136). The pleasure principle 
discharged "instinctual tension" via the autonomic system and the 
reality principle discharged them via the motor system (p. 136). 
Affect then 
acts as a safety valve when tension is too high and action is 
delayed. But [Arnold points out] if emotion is an alternative 
to action, and action is not possible at all [as in dreams], 
the emotion felt is frustrated love, impotent anger, or help-
less fear, none of which is pleasant. (pp. 136-137, my italics) 
This observation is intriguing in light of the previously discussed 
findings regarding dysphoric emotions in dream reports. Arnold believes 
that Freud's discharge and safety valve models together do not explain 
"the displeasure of frustration'' (p. 137) or emotions like joy or sorrow 
where there "is no urge to action, hence no instinctual energy 
cathecting an object" (p. 137). It also bothers her that Freud saw 
anxiety not as an "affect charge" but as an emotion reflecting frustra-
ted drive discharge and thus as a special case. 
Arnold finds Freud's propositions about emotions untenable 
at two points. First, she questions the premise of emotions as 
instinctually based. Referring to the endocrine system, she points 
out that instinctual forces are not constant but periodic and precede 
perception. In practice "the somatic state comes before [and sensitizes] 
perception and appraisal of an object in instincts [hunger, sex], but 
after such appraisal in emotions" (p. 142). Arnold's second disagree-
ment with Freud concerns the apparently different genesis of different 
emotions. 
Though anxiety (fear) was still thought to be aroused by the 
perception of a threat, love and anger become the affect 
charges of the libidinal and aggressive drives. As such, they 
are aroused by an object, but are experienced when the drive 
cathects the object. Whatever the merits of this explanation 
for personality theory, for a theory of emotion it is un-
acceptable because it makes an unjustifiable distinction 
between emotions aroused by objects and emotions that are the 
experience of a drive cathexis. (p. 170) 
Arnold maintains that "Freud himself never felt quite easy over this 
division" (p. 139). 
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While Arnold's own theory of emotion is referred to as "cognitive" 
(Arnold, Ed., 1970), it is extensively grounded in physiological 
research and accounts for psychological and behavioral components. She 
asserts that any "definition that really attempts to define always 
includes the experience as well as the motor aspect of emotion" (p. 92), 
that psychologists have always agreed on this point, and that they "have 
disagreed only in what they consider cause and what effect" (p. 93). 
Arnold then proceeds to "discover" how the felt experience and 
physical upset are related and "how such an all-over effect can arise" 
(p. 92). She maintains that "the explanation of the mechanism producing 
this all-over effect is crucial for any theory" (p. 93) and postulates 
cognition to fulfilling this function. In the end, Arnold describes 
emotion as 
the felt tendency toward anything intuitively appraised as 
good (beneficial), or away from anything intuitively appraised 
as bad (harmful). This attraction or aversion is accompanied 
by a pattern of physiological changes organized toward approach 
or withdrawal. The patterns differ for different emotions. 
(p. 182) 
This is described by Arnold as a "perception-appraisal-emotion" 
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(p. 177) model. It stands in contrast to descriptions of emotion which 
"telescope perceiving and doing into one action sequence" (p. 178) and, 
as Arnold sees it, fail to "explain why the same perception results 
sometimes in one and sometimes in another emotion and action" (p. 178). 
Arnold's paradigm comprises four aspects: perception, intuitive appraisal, 
felt tendency (the emotion proper), and physiological change organized 
toward action. The key element is appraisal: 
at the base of every emotion there is some kind of perception 
or awareness of an object, a person, or a situation, which 
in some cases becomes emotional, in other cases remains (in 
the words of William James) a 'cold perception.' (p. 93) 
The object of perception may be present or "merely imagined" (p. 171). 
To perceive is to recognize an object, person, or situation as it exists 
apart from its effect on me. Objects, persons, or situations may be 
perceived without engendering emotion. 
Appraisal which is "direct, immediate, intuitive" (p. 172) 
completes perception. Perceptions inhering emotions require a 
subjective element which is appraisal. It is a non-reflective "sense 
judgment of weal or woe" (p. 172) for me personally. In emotion "the 
object must be appraised as affecting me in some way, affecting me 
personally as an individual with my particular experience and my 
particular aims" (p. 171). Arnold claims a "psychological capacity of 
appraising" (p. 173) which is innate but not infallible. She reasons 
that this capacity is not a function of learning because without memory 
and appraisal learning from past experience seems impossible to 
begin with. 
[Intuitive appraisal] is often supplemented or corrected by 
later reflections. When this happens, the emotion changes 
with the new intuitive estimate which follows the corrective 
judgment • • • • Whenever there is no intuitive appraisal • • • 
but only reflective judgment, the matter becomes strictly 
speculative--there is no emotion. This seems to happen in the 
emotional flattening of the schizophrenic. (pp. 175-176) 
Whatever its merit, this conunent is interesting in light of the 
observed qualities of dream emotions which might be described as 
more emotionally "flat" than waking emotion. In a similar vein, 
Arnold holds that if emotions seem 
vague and objectless, as in neurotic anxiety or in depres-
sion [or dreams?] •••• These are departures from normal 
functioning. Normal emotion carries with it the reference 
to an object or situation that is known in some way. (p. 170) 
All perceptions and appraisals do not lead to emotion. For 
Arnold, the third requisite of emotion is a felt action tendency 
which derives from perception and an intuitive appraisal that an 
object, person, or situation is either desirable or threatening. 
This felt tendency is "expressed as various bodily changes, and • 
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eventually may lead to overt action" (p. 177). Arnold regards "feeling 
[as] a direct experience and neither a construct nor an inference" 
{p. 70) and suggests that "the emotional quale consist precisely in 
that unreasoning involuntary attraction or repulsion" (p. 172). 
Merely recognizing a thing or person or knowing that it is "theoretically 
or abstractly" good or bad for me does not trigger emotion. 
But if I think something is good for me here and now, and feel 
myself drawn toward it sometimes even against my better ~~ 
judgment, then my experience is properly speaking, non-
rational; it is other than just cold reason; it is an 
addition to knowledge: it is emotional. (p. 172) 
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A felt tendency of attraction or repulsion is "an impulse to 
action that brings with it a host of physiological changes" (p. 178). 
These changes constitute the fourth element in Arnold's paradigm. They 
demand action under penalty of distress. "To act as we feel urged to 
act, so that we finally reach the goal we desire, brings not only the 
possession of what we long f.or but also alleviates physical discomfort" 
(p. 179). Arnold notes that physical upset follows perception-appraisal-
felt tendency, citing research findings that "emotion is reported 
before any peripheral changes can be felt or observed" (pp. 179-180). 
Ten years after its definitive inception Arnold's description 
of the emotional process was essentially intact. 
The emotion becomes a felt tendency toward anything appraised 
as good, and away from anything appraised as bad. This 
definition allows us to specify how emotion is related to 
action. It also allows us to state how emotion is aroused: 
whatever is perceived, remembered, imagined will be appraised; 
if it is appraised as desirable or harmful, an action tendency 
is aroused. And as we appraise the situation as more desirable 
or harmful, we become aware not only that we tend toward or 
away from it, but also that this is an emotional tendency. 
(Arnold, Ed., 1970, p. 176) 
Here the function of subsequent appraisal is apparent. Moreover, 
Arnold (1970) maintains that "most of the newer theories [see Arnold, 
Ed., 1970, Part III] of feeling and emotion assume that these 
experiences depend on the interpretation and evaluation of the situation" 
(p. 123). Differences in the various models hinge on definitions of 
cognition and "the relation of emotion to action" (p. 124). 
EMOTIONS AND SLEEP PHYSIOLOGY 
The joint event comprised by concomitant emotion and sleep 
physiology is a critical juncture in conceptualizing dream emotions. 
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This perspective, too, has been neglected by dream researchers and 
theorists. This section considers some theoretical aspects of emotions 
within certain physical constraints of sleep and proposes some explana-
tions for findings of few and dysphoric emotions in dream reports. 
Arnold's paradigm for emotion is referred to because it lends itself 
to the purpose. Other models might serve as well. The psychoanalytic 
viewpoint, for example, would seem to afford an especially intriguing 
perspective from which to examine concomitant emotional and dreaming 
states. 
To recapitulate, Arnold describes emotion as follows: (1) An 
object, person, or situation is perceived or imagined, (2) immediate, 
intuitive appraisal occurs, (3) a felt action tendency toward or away 
is experienced as emotion, (4) physiological changes occur organized 
toward approach or withdrawal, and (5) overt action may ensue. Now 
to look at each of these aspects of the emotion process during sleep. 
For Arnold emotion requires perception which may either involve 
sensory experience or be imagined. Arkin and Antrobus (in Arkin et al., 
1978, pp. 352-366) reviewed studies of the impact of external sensory 
stimuli during sleep. They conclude that "cognitive responses of some 
form may occur in both REM and NREM sleep as a result of external 
stimulation" (p. 366); and when such responses are noted, the stimuli 
are often transformed or only partly represented. In sleep, responses 
to stimuli originating outside the sleeping person probably occur much 
less often than not, and perception is more of the imagined variety. 
While Arnold points out that imagining may get us just as "stirred up" 
as experience, it is still plausible that limited perceptual data could 
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impact on dream emotions. A characterization for this impact will be 
suggested after appraisal, which "completes perception," is discussed. 
The appraisal element of emotion may or may not operate in dreams 
as in waking experience. If it proceeds "normally," we instictively 
judge perceived or imagined events or people as good or bad for us 
personally--so far so good. If, however, this mechanism operates 
differently or does not operate during sleep, various scenarios might 
ensue. Arnold maintains that where no appraisal and only reflective 
judgment occurs "there is no emotion" (p. 176). One explanation for a 
scarcity of emotions in dream reports is that intuitive appraisal, 
and hence emotion, occurs less frequently or differently in dreams than 
in waking experience. 
An absence of appraisal and a predominance of reflective judgment 
could derive from the fact that a dream report is a recounting and not 
a dream. A critical and obvious issue, but one easily overlooked, is 
that second parties never observe dreams. Snyder's (1969) summary of 
this matter is concise. 
As many have pointed out before, the only relevant empirical 
data ever available to us are reports of dream memories, prod-
ducts of the waking mind, reflecting all of its complexity and 
fallibility. So our raw data are already twice removed from 
hypothetical origins:· first by the wrenching transition from 
sleeping or dreaming to waking, and secondly by the perilous 
translation from subjective experience to verbal reports. But, 
even in this form, such reports are merely collections of words; 
usually, in order to make any use of them, we then subject 
them to an additional process of judgment, analysis or other 
variety of manipulation. Surely if there were any alternative 
approach to this matter, we would recoil from such dubious, , 
third-hand information--but there is not. (p. 18) 
These issues are especially relevant with regard to emotions in 
dreams when considered from Arnold's perspective where emotions are by 
definition intrinsic with experience. If emotions in my dream report 
seem inappropriate or "curiously lacking" to a naive observer, this 
could be because that observer did not experience the dream. My dream 
is exclusively my creation. I wrote the script. Before the onset, I 
knew the score. No one else may know it as I do. To the degree that 
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a report is reflective, emotions are recounted and not reexperienced. 
For a second party they may only be inferred from verbal identification 
or described dream behavior or circumstances. True emotions in dream 
reports are waking and not dreaming emotions. It would seem that actual 
emotions may not transpire in written accounts. 
Findings of predominantly dysphoric emotions in dreams might be 
accounted for at the perception-appraisal stage. In this case appraisal 
would seem to harbinger negative consequences for the dreamer. Why? A 
clue may be found in the studies previously cited. Emotions described 
as negative, dysphoric, or unpleasant are defined differently by 
different authors. Snyder found that "the affect most frequently men-
tioned was neither pleasant nor unpleasant, but that of diffuse 
excitement" {p. 141). Fear and anxiety, however, constituted one-third 
of dream emotions in Snyder's study. Stairs and Blick agree with Snyder 
in this regard. Kramer et al. found negative event outcomes, anxiety, 
and hostility more frequent in dream reports than early memory reports. 
Kroon observed that subjects felt more often tense and distant from 
other people in dreams than in daytime reports. In Hall and Van de Castle's 
norms, confusion and apprehension constitute over one-half of the total 
dream emotions for both men and women; for the dreamer as a character 
in his or her dream, essentially one-half of emotions fall in these two 
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groupings. Hall and Van de Castle's classification of "apprehension" 
includes "fear, anxiety, guilt, and embarrassment" (p. 111). They 
concede that "confusion" is probably not an emotion noting that it 
"resides more in the head as a state of cognitive ambiguity than it does 
in the viscera as a gut-type reaction" (p. 112, my italics). One 
might wonder about this observation in light of Arnold's model. In 
summary, these various researchers define dysphoric emotions as feelings 
like fear, confusion, ambiguity, and tension while anxiety crops up 
everywhere. 
A brief example might illustrate a possible link between restricted 
perceptual data, appraisal, and these kinds of dysphoric emotions. When 
something leaps from the bushes, I react instantly; and I look to the 
object or the situation for clues. Is it a monster!? While the data 
are ambiguous or scarce, I am anxious; confused, apprehensive, tense, 
and fearful. When I believe that I have the correct information from 
the environment, I fight, run, or laugh in comic relief: It's a hallo-
ween costume! Between initial perception and ultimate action, I 
rapidly reappraise the information available from the environment. 
Arnold's idea of serial appraisals based in perception is consis-
tent with other authors. Schachter and Singer (1962) cite Plutchik (1938); 
Hunt, Cole, and Reis (1958); and Schachter (1959) to suggest "that one 
labels, interprets, and identifies this stirred-up (emotional) state in 
terms of the characteristics of the precipitating situation and one's 
apperceptive mass" (pp. 379-380). Cognition "exerts a steering function" 
(p. 380) in the present situation based on past experience. Schachter 
and Singer interpret their findings to support this contention. Their 
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study and paradigm are subject to question on both methodological and 
theoretical grounds (Plutchik, 1970, p. 7); nevertheless, a salient role 
for external data in the cognitive evaluational aspect of emotion seems 
reasonable. If we often depend on external data to identify emotions 
and if, as previously noted, access to these data is restricted if not 
precluded during sleep, then emotions reflecting anxiety, confusion, 
tension, or fear might well prevail. 
Arnold's third and fourth aspects of emotion, a felt tendency to 
act--the emotion proper--and physiological change organized toward 
approach or withdrawal, must in dreams conform with the physiology of 
sleep. A comprehensive discussion of sleep physiology is far beyond 
my expertise and the scope of this presentation, but a brief review 
of same salient points may suffice. To this end, Pivik's review of 
"Psychophysiological Models of Sleep Mentation" (pp. 245-271) in 
Arkin et al. (1978) is instructive. 
According to Pivik, the conceptualization of sleep has progressed 
through three phases. Historically, sleep was seen as unitary. In 
1953 Aserinsky and Kleitman observed periods of "eye motility," 
and quiescence during sleep and ushered in the now familiar REM 
(rapid-eye-movement) and NREM (non-rapid-eye-movement) (Dement & 
Kleitman, 1957) or two-state model. Aserinsky and Kleitman obtained 
dream reports from REM awakenings 74 percent of the time. Snyder (1969) 
notes that "at least sixteen systematic studies" (p. 18) have essentially 
replicated these findings. Moruzzi (1963, 1965) proposed the most 
recent sleep paradigm. According to Pivik, this "tonic-phasic" model 
sees REM sleep as including "irregular alteration between periods of 
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of activity upon which are superimposed 'sudden [erruptions] of an 
ensemble of phasic events [Moruzzi, 1963, p. 291-292]'" (p. -253). 
Differences in tonic events, REM-NREM, were described as "largely 
ones of degree and not of kind • [while] phasic events within 
REM represented activity which was fundamentally different from the 
tonic background upon which it was superimposed" (p. 254). To skip 
a lot of interesting findings and reasoning and summarize very briefly, 
Pivik maintains that the two-state REM-NREM dichotomy has "been laid 
to rest (Dement, 1973)" (p. 268) as an heuristically viable model and 
concludes that attempts to match temporally discreet physiological 
and psychological measures during sleep have failed. In a forward to 
Pivik' s presentations, S. J. Ellman (Arkin et al. , 1978) observes "the 
hope that physiological conditions will be translated directly into 
mental events" (p. 244) is belied by "the history of sleep research" 
(p. 244). While "it is clear ••• that phasic activity is not the 
determinant of sleep mentation per se" (p. 268), ultimate implications 
from the tonic-phasic paradigm are less clear. 
While phasic activity may not determine sleep mentation, its 
components are interesting with respect to dream emotions. This 
cyclic temporal clustering of certain activities, Moruzzi's "ensemble," 
is recognized by most researchers (Pivik, p. 246). In his review of 
"The Physiology of Dreaming" (Kramer, Ed., 1969, pp. 7-31), Snyder notes 
that the state has been called by almost two dozen names with "REM" 
probably the most familiar. Jones (1970) lists some of its elements: 
concomitant presence of irregular pulse, blood pressure, and 
respiration; penile erection; rapid conjugate eye movement; 
sporadic activity of certain fine muscle groups; near absence 
of tonic anti-gravity muscle potential; a low voltage 
desynchronized cortical EEG pattern; high brain temperature and 
metabolic rate; and, in humans, a high-positive correlation 
with ability to report dreams upon being awakened. (pp. 24-25) 
As preface to further consideration of Arnold's model of emotion 
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during sleep, one might combine these scientific findings with a homely 
observation: During sleep our capacities to see, hear, smell, touch, 
and taste are quite restricted and purposeful voluntary motor activity 
such as walking, talking, and using our hands is rarely exhibited. At 
the same time, there transpire periods of involuntary physiological 
arousal, the origin and function of which are presently not understood 
(Snyder, 1969). This combined state could reflect tendencies to act 
and attempts at physiological change organized toward action, Arnold's 
third and fourth components of emotion, where things are "stirred-up" 
autonomically, but may not achieve operant fruition because in dreams 
voluntary motor behavior is essentially paralyzed! Perhaps the roots of 
dysphoric dream emotions like tension, apprehension, or anxiety lie here. 
All things considered, it would not be surprising to find emotions 
stylized by at least two constraints of sleep physiology: (1) most 
perceptions are limited to intrinsic referents, and (2) voluntary motor 
capacities are effectively precluded. These constraints could impact 
throughout the emotion process. Since perception and appraisal which 
completes it probably often depend on extrinsic information, emotions 
experienced when these data are excluded might reasonably reflect 
anxiety and confusion. Felt tendencies to act and concomitant physic-
logical adaptation organized toward action may develop to a degree 
consistent with the respective perception and appraisal; however, since 
access to voluntary motor behavior is very limited in sleep and 
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particularly so during periods of more prolific dream recall, overt 
action may not ensue. Within the sleep framework, when imagination 
engenders emotion, the net affect could be reflected in periods of 
autonomic arousal which are recounted after waking as tension, confusion, 
and apprehension. 
At another level, since the dream is totally the dreamer's 
creation and nothing is ever a surprise, 
situations that would undoubtedly be terrifying or depressing 
for the average individual [under awake conditions] may be 
reported in some detail, but [with] a description of their 
emotional impact upon the dreamer • • • curiously lacking 
(Hall & Van de Castle, 1966, p. 110) 
from the standpoint of the nondreaming observer who does not know the 
score. 
CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY OF DREAM RESEARCH 
While the potential list may be interminable, Winget and Kramer 
(1979) list seven "factors which separately and in interaction may 
influence the content of the verbal report obtained" (p. 6). These are: 
(1) the setting, (2) the method of awakening, (3) the interpersonal 
situation between the dream reporter and the dream collector, (4) differ-
ent stages of sleep and times of night, (5) the method of recording the 
dream report, and (6) the type of subject from whom the dream is 
collected. These and related elements will now be considered under 
headings of subject and procedural factors. 
SUBJECT FACTORS 
The role of idiographic or personality factors in the expression of 
emotions in waking and dream reports has been investigated (Starker, 1973, 
1974, 1977; Cohen, 1974; Fisher & Greenberg, 1977). Following a train 
of research, Foulkes and Rechtschaffen (1964); Foulkes, Spear, and 
Symonds (1966); Vogle, Foulkes, and Trosman (1966); and Vogel (1978) 
compared waking, hypnagogic or sleep onset (SO), and REM fantasy in 
various contexts. Foulkes et al. contend that the hypnagogic non-
dreamer exhibits characteristics of the 
'authoritarian personality' syndrome ••• [and] exerts rigidly 
successful control over his impulse life, [while] the high 
nocturnal fantasizer shows fascination with impulse life • 
in conjunction with weakened ego control mechanisms. (pp. 284-285) 
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With respect to emotions specifically, a decline in affect "concomitant 
with an increase in hallucinatory dreamlike experience" (p 235) was 
noted with "emotional flattening [being] the primary affective charac-
teristic of the hypnagogic period" (p. 235). Vogel (1978) defined "four 
SO EEG/EOG stages ••. ranging in succession from awake and alert, or 
awake but drowsy, through drifting off to sleep, to light sleep" (p. 97). 
In general "a steady decline in control over the course of mental activ-
ity and awareness of the immediate environment and a steady rise in the 
frequency of hallucinatory experience" (p. 98) accompanied this sequence; 
however, large variations in this scheme reflecting individual differ-
ences were noted. The overall essence of these studies may be expressed 
in Vogel's conclusion that "the central empirical findings . are: 
(1) that SO and REM fantasy are independent of each other; and (2) that 
each is related to different waking personality variables" (p. 107). 
SO fantasy is seen as initiated voluntarily through ego regression and 
is related to waking fantasy, whereas REM fantasy stems from unconscious 
wishes and is "never volitionally initiated" (p. 108). Edney (1980) 
points out that this is a psychoanalytic explanation and supports the 
independent processes model. 
Starker (1977) examined "the relationship between patterns of 
daydream activity and nocturnal dreams" (p. 411) for three individual 
'"styles' of daydreaming (Singer & Antrobus, 1963, 1972; Starker, 
1973; Isaacs, 1975)" (p. 411). These are the Guilty-Dysphoric, 
Positive-Vivid, and Anxious-Distractible styles. He concluded that 
when persons of differing but relatively pure daydream styles 
are compared as to nocturnal dream characteristics, the 
stylistic consistencies observed in waking fantasy appear 
also in dream productions, particularly affective polarity and 
bizarreness. Dreams and daydreams appear to be highly inter-
related aspects of the fantasy process, sharing important 
affective and structural components. (p. 411) 
Vogel (1978) and Starker (1977) represent different but, in cer-
tain respects, similar lines of research and thought. Both identify 
personality structures which are consistently reflected in both waking 
and sleeping fantasy productions. Within a given structural pattern, 
Vogel sees independent functions for the two fantasy states, while 
37 
Starker points to marked degrees of consistency between them. Maybe 
these positions are not incompatible: While overall, idiographic 
styles of thinking, reflected in fantasies, remain generally constant 
across waking and sleeping experiences, the functions of the respective 
fantasies serve different purposes or are, at least, expressed differ-
ently. Most salient to the present purpose, both lines of thought and 
research identify patterns of mentation with significant affective 
components. These patterns characterize relatively distinct person-
ality groups and are evident in both waking behavior and dream reports. 
There is good evidence that dream reports from so-called "re-
caller" and "nonrecaller" populations differ not only in quantitative 
but qualitative dimensions, and these differences persist without re-
gard to the report setting. Lewis, Goodenough, Shapiro, and Sleser 
(1966) found that even when subjects sleep in a laboratory, while "non-
reporters and reporters did not differ in REM-period frequency or EEG 
patterns during sleep, non-reporters did report dreams less frequently 
following REM-period awakenings" (p. 52). While quantitative report 
differences define the two populations, Barber (1969) found that dream 
"Reporter reports were easier to recall and contained more drive content 
than Nonreporter reports. There were no differences in recall ability" 
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(p. 248). Cohen (1974), too, concluded that individual differences in 
memory do not account for differences in dream-recall frequency (p. 142), 
and suggested that "factors peculiar to the dream itself and to the sleep 
and waking situation need to be explored" (p. 142). Cohen and MacNeilage 
(1973) examined REM reports from recallers and nonrecallers across "four 
salience dimensions" and found recallers' dreams to be more vivid and 
bizarre while incoporating more affect and activity by the dreamer. 
Hall and Van de Castle (1966) confirmed a typical finding that 
females' dreams are about 8 percent longer than males'. Their female 
subjects reported more total emotions in dreams than did male subjects. 
Since female reports were longer, this difference may be a function of 
report length. 
PROCEDURAL FACTORS 
A body of studies exists to indicate that the introduction of 
emotionally loaded factors before sleep may influence emotions in 
dream reports (Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964; Goodenough et al., 1975; 
Torda, 1975; Lehto, 1980). Foulkes and Rechtschaffen found that violent 
TV westerns preceded REM reports which were "longer, more imaginative, 
more vivid" (p. 996), but not necessarily "more emotional" than reports 
following nonviolent TV westerns. Using a multifaceted design wherein 
subjects viewed "stress films" before sleep, Goodenough et al. con-
eluded that "at least under the conditions of this experiment it seems 
clear that a stressful event during the day can produce anxiety dreams" 
(p. 317). Torda examined reports from REM awakenings to 
suggest that endogenous affects [induced by posthypnotic 
suggestion or anxiety inducing pre-sleep films] may modify 
the content of concurrent dreams. These concurrent 
emotions become incorporated into the memory traces of the 
dream. (p. 258) 
Lehto (1980) found that when subjects were assigned topics to dream 
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about, those who were operationally defined as controlling dreams about 
unpleasant topics "had significantly lower amounts of REM activity • • • 
[and] significantly lower % REM time" (p. 3) than did subjects control-
ling pleasant dream topics. While these studies suggest that emotional 
components of waking experience may influence subsequent dream reports, 
the precise extent and quality of these effects are unclear. 
The issue of whether "home" or laboratory dream reports are a 
more valid and reliable measure of the dream experience has an interest-
ing history which is intimately involved with assumptions about the 
nature of sleep and related procedural matters. When sleep was viewed 
as an unitary experience, dreams were recalled spontaneously after 
awakening and seemed too subjective to manage within the traditional 
scientific paradigm. The discovery of REM sleep spurred the hope of 
a physically defined parameter of dreaming and triggered an onslaught 
of laboratory sleep studies in which subjects were awakened during a 
predetermined physiological state. But as early as 1959 Goodenough, 
Shapiro, Holden, and Steinschriber suggested that occular activity alone 
is not the key to dream recall. They found individuals differ in 
frequencies of dream recall and that these differences maintain even 
for REM awakenings. Also, a "surprisingly high percentage of recall" 
{p. 297) was found from periods of occular quiescence. In 1962 Foulkes 
suggested that "reportable mental activity is always present in the 
sleeping human" (p. 24). Hall and Van de Castle (1966) found evidence 
to indicate that reports from REM awakenings and those recalled after 
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arising in the morning "do not differ in any important respect" (p. 32). 
Cartwright (1969) reported "increasing evidence of dreaming having an 
independent existence outside of REM time" (p. 366) and, reflective 
of Foulkes, that mental activity appears to be continuous throughout the 
twenty-four hour day" (p. 369). By 1978 Goodenough was able to cite 
numerous evidence and studies to indicate "that the REM definition of 
dreaming is inadequate" (p. 115). 
Nevertheless, researchers observed apparent differences when they 
compared reports of spontaneously recalled dreams with dreams reported 
after laboratory awakenings. Hall and Van de Castle (1966) and Weisz 
and Foulkes (1970) contended that while "impulse-related content" 
(Weisz & Foulkes, p. 588) such as "aggression" (Hall & Van de Castle, 
p. 32; Weisz & Foulkes, p. 588) is more prevalent in home dreams 
recalled after awakening than in laboratory reports, the two "do not 
differ in any important respects" (Hall & Van de Castle, p. 32). 
Cartwright and Kaszniak (1978) concluded that laboratory dreams are 
"less dramatic than those dreamed at home" (p. 277). 
Cohen (1969 b) found that dreams remembered in the morning, which 
usually seem more dramatic, are often from early or late REM periods 
while the "longest and most intense dreams [come from] nights with 
fewer REM periods" (p. 435). He also pointed to individual differences, 
noting that remembered dreams are more frequent "for subjects with 
greater density [more eye movements per REM period] and lower awakening 
reaction time" (p. 435). At the same time, Cohen noted growing 
interest associated with different stages of sleep under varying 
experimental conditions (Foulkes, 1966, 1967; Goodenou~h, 
1967; Goodenough et al., 1965; Lewis, Goodenough, Shapiro, 
and Sleser, 1966). (p. 434) 
41 
They suggest that the dream experience might be profitably investigated 
using either the home or laboratory format. 
Cartwright and Kaszniak (1978) reviewed "The Social Psychology 
of Dream Reporting" (Arkin et al., Chapter 8). They describe the 
laboratory and home settings as sleeping "in public or in private" 
(p. 278) respectively and conclude that a report reflects the situation 
as it is "valued by the subject" (p. 291). Laboratory reports "tend 
to support one's waking motivations and enhance a sense of self-worth 
in that context" {p. 291). Presumably a subject's evaluation of the 
report context whether it be home or laboratory will impact on the 
dream report. On the other hand, Weisz and Foulkes (1970) 
concluded that, although impulse-related content may be more 
likely to occur in home dreams than in laboratory dreams, the 
basic dream processes of imagination, distortion, dramti-
zation, etc., are the same in both settings. (p. 588) 
Rather than debate which is better, Cartwright and Kaszniak suggest 
that 
dreams collected in the laboratory be understood as behavior 
in their own right, not as pale shadows of the more 'real' home 
dreams. All dreams have both state and trait characteristics 
and as such must be interpreted in the light of the particular 
emotional context which preceded them and the motivation 
operating at the time. (p. 291) 
A comparison of either home or laboratory reports with verbal 
reports of temporally preceding waking experience evaluated in a 
similar fashion might afford clues to the concomitant emotional 
and motivational parameters alluded to by Cartwright and Kaszniak as 
well as other variables of interest. This study might be described 
as a comparison of emotions from dream reports with "the particular 
emotional context which preceded them." 
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Since a home diary report procedure was used, reference to 
Domhoff (1969) and Cohen (1974), who prefer home reports, is pertinent. 
Consistent with others, Domhoff found that home dreams exhibited 
greater proportion of aggression, sexual interaction, misfortune, and 
castration anxiety, and more aggression, friendliness, sex, success, 
failure, and both good and bad fortune than did laboratory dreams. He 
emphasized "psychological vigilance in the laboratory rather than 
selective recall" (p. 214) to explain the more colorful nature of home 
dream reports. Domhoff feels that home reports are a more representative 
sample of dream experience than reports from REM awakenings and tap 
"deeper layers of the human psyche" (p. 215). Some would, of course, 
contest this assertion. The point is that home dreams may afford 
acceptable data, idiosyncrasies notwithstanding. 
According to Cohen (1974): 
dream recall and dream-recall frequency are assessed by 
questionnaire, diary, and sleep interruption methods. 
Earlier reports (Cohen, 1969 a) suggested that such 
measures are not always closely related. However, more 
recent data indicated that the close relationship among them 
justifies the assumption that results obtained from the use 
of any one of the approaches can be generalized. For 
example it has been found repeatedly and reported in pub-
lished (Cohen, 1972 a; Cohen, 1973 b; Cohen & MacNeilage, 
1973; MacNeilage, Cohen, & MacNeilage, 1972) and unpub-
lished studies that questionnaire and diary measures of 
dream-recall frequency produce results that are closely 
related and highly predictive of laboratory recall (Cohen & 
MacNeilage, 1973; Lewis, Goodenough, Shapiro, & Sleser, 
1966). (p. 139) 
Cohen believes that constructs such as repression, salience, and 
interference address the issue of dream recall while dream recall 
frequency is a function of "life style (personality)" or "individual 
differences" (p. 138). He contends that "salience" and not repression 
critically determines dream recall; and if this be so, "a sample of 
available reports is a psychodynamically unbiased estimate of the 
population of dream experiences" (p. 150) wherein the "editorial 
activities" of the reporter enhance the individual character of the 
report. 
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Both home and laboratory procedures influence data. The setting; 
the interpersonal relationship between the dream reporter and the dream 
collector, especially as it is interpreted by the reporter; the 
personality of the report; and the manner in which reports are secured 
all interact in complex ways to characterize dream reports. No method 
is "best," but one may better suit specific research objectives. 
Sampson (1969) suggests that both home and laboratory procedures 
influence results. "The relevant sampling issue ••• is not (in my 
opinion) whether home dream reports are in some sense biased [but, 
rather, are they] useful and reliable" (p. 221-222) for the purpose at 
hand. Of course, results must be viewed in the light of procedures. 
Different methods may generate data which are valid in portraying 
different aspects of a highly intricate dream, dream-recall, dream 
report conglomerate. 
Hall and Van de Castle (1966) and others (Kramer et al., 1971; 
Foulkes & Fleisher, 1975; Corriere et al., 1977; Cartwright, 1978) 
contend that questions which invol~e meaningful comparisons of an 
individual's dreams and waking life "are best answered by having 
reliable measures of dream behavior and waking life behavior" (p. 25). 
For these comparisons to exhibit at least face validity, all reports must 
derive from procedures which, while surely not identical, attempt a 
semblance of equivalence. 
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In the present study, the key question is: How do emotions in 
dream reports compare with emotions in reports of waking experience? 
The critical design elements are not peculiarities of particular sample 
group or procedure, but rather that both dream and waking experience 
reports are obtained from the same subjects under circumstances which 
are as nearly equivalent as possible within practical limitations and 
that reports are evaluated according to identical criteria. Since 
prior comparisons of this sort have either not really measured waking 
experience (Snyder, 1970; Stairs & Blick, 1972), measured waking and 
dream reports of events from two very distant points in time (Kramer 
et al., 1971), or forced subjects to report affect (Kramer et al., 1971; 
Kroon, 1972; Stairs & Blick, 1979) where none may have been reported 
otherwise, the central issue addressed by this study has remained moot. 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS I THROUGH V 
At this point, a sunnnary of the preceding chapters may be useful. 
We use waking experience as a baseline against which to compare 
dreams. Dreams have been described as very similar or "continuous" 
and quite different, discontinuous, or "compensatory" with waking 
experience. In any case, mentation during both states seems to vary 
in consonance with individual personality structure. 
Within the dreaming versus waking experience framework, descrip-
tions of the nature of dream emotions constitute a very mixed bag 
indeed. While some researchers are puzzled that dream emotions seem 
fewer and more dysphoric than expected, others see dreams as mechanisms 
for venting emotions, and still others believe that dream emotions 
"parallel" waking affect. Studies which actually compare measures from 
both states find that dream emotions are less frequent, more unpleasant, 
and may even reflect different aspects of experience. 
The nature of emotions per se is a critical factor which has been 
essentially ignored by dream researchers. Arnold's model lends itself 
to the consideration of dream emotions, especially as they relate to 
sleep physiology. Within this paradigm, restricted extrinsic perceptual 
data and limited recourse to voluntary physical action during sleep may 
be reflected in a limited incidence of emotions and a predominance of 
emotions which suggest confusion and anxiety in dream reports. 
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The emotional dimensions observed in any dream study involve a 
complex mix of subject and procedural variables. Factors such as an 
individual's personality, sex, and whether or not he or she typically 
remembers dreams dictate results. Where, when, and how dream accounts 
are obtained and a dreamer's pre-sleep experiences also characterize 
reports. Altogether, the observed frequency and quality of emotions in 
a dream study are as much a function of the research design as the 
dreamer's contribution. 
CHAPTER VII 
DESCRIPTION OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND PROSPECTUS 
The purpose of the present study is to determine if the incidence 
or kinds of apparent emotions in dream reports differs from emotions in 
reports of waking experiences. To achieve a more homogeneous sample, 
all subjects were female. Since mentation across the dreaming and 
waking states may vary in consonance with individual personality 
structure (Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964; Foulkes et al., 1966; 
Vogel et al., 1966; Starker, 1973, 1974, 1977; Cohen, 1974; Fisher 
& Greenberg, 1977; Vogel, 1978) subjects served as their own controls. 
Frequency counts for five classes of emotions were scored independently 
by two judges according to Hall and Van de Castle's (1966) scale. 
Both total f~equencies and rates of emotions per 100 words of report, 
for waking experience and dream reports from contiguous evening-morning 
time frames, were compared for statistically significant differences. 
In general, these data suggest that the amounts and kinds of 
emotions in these dream and waking experience reports do not differ. 
However, there is some indication that this may not be the case for all 
individuals. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Nineteen women students, nine enrolled in an evening class in 
Personal and Social Adjustment (PSA) and 10 in an afternoon class in 
the Psychology of Women (PW), at Portland State University were 
selected as subjects on the basis of a Sleep and Dream Habits 
Questionnaire adapted from Lehto (1980) (Appendix A). Of the nine 
individuals who completed the project, two were from the PSA and seven 
from the PW class. 
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In an attempt to insure the subject's privacy, no personal or 
demographic data other than name, address, phone number, and age were 
solicited. Since subject's anonymity was considered important, no 
attempt was made to identify the nine women who finished the study. It 
is, therefore, impossible to distinguish them from the 10 who did not. 
The PSA group ranged in age from 19 to 32 with a mean age of 24.4 and 
a standard deviation of 4.58. The PW women were from 18 to 43 years 
old. Their mean age was 30.2 years with a standard deviation of 7.41. 
The subject selection criteria were people who purported to 
remember their dreams at least twice during the previous two weeks 
and were interested in participating in the study. The following are 
data from the Sleep and Dream Habits Questionnaires of the 19 indivi-
duals who started the project: Five were using a prescribed medication; 
fourteen were not. One fell asleep within 5 minutes, six within 5 to 10 
minutes, seven within 10 to 15 minutes, four within 15 to 20 minutes, 
and one took more than 20 minutes after going to bed. One slept less 
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than five hours; two, five to six hours; and sixteen, seven to eight hours 
per night. Ten reported having a regular bedtime and waking time and nine 
did not. Five went to bed about 10 P.M., ten about 11 P.M., and four 
about 12 A.M. Six got up about 6 A.M., 10 about 7 A.M., and one each at 
about 8, 9, and 10 A.M. Five recalled having been dreaming just about 
every morning, seven most mornings, three about every other morning, and 
four about two mornings a week during the two week period preceding the 
study. Two recorded just about every dream, one recorded one dream, and 
sixteen had not recorded a dream during the previous two weeks. One 
remembered a few parts, eight many parts, seven most parts, and three 
reported remembering their dreams in great detail. One was a little 
interested, five moderately interested, and thirteen extremely interested 
in dreams. One was a little interested, eight moderately interested, and 
ten extremely interested in participating in the project. 
All 19 subjects signed an Informed Consent Form (Appendix B) 
required by Portland State University. 
The nine subjects who completed the study were paid $10 each when 
they turned in their reports to the experimenter. The seven PW subjects 
were granted extra class credit for participating. These considerations 
were offered to all subjects upon selection. 
Procedures 
Data Collection. Subject selection and data collection were con-
ducted at Portland State University during the winter term of 1983. The 
procedure was essentially the same for both the PSA and PW classes. It 
began with the experimenter reading the following statement to the class: 
I am Dean Conklin. For my Master's thesis I am doing a 
study which requires obtaining written reports of dreams 
and waking experiences from female subjects. I need some 
women who are willing to write down some of their waking 
experiences and dreams for me. This will be done at home 
and will require a few minutes of your time each evening 
and morning for two weeks. You need not report events 
which you consider to be too personal in nature. Your 
name will not be used on the reports. You will be referred 
to by numbers only. I am not concerned with knowing who 
wrote a given report. I will pay those who complete the 
project $10 each. I need to have those of you who are 
willing to do so fill out a questionnaire. This will take 
about two minutes. People who fill out questionnaires may 
not necessarily be selected to participate in the study. 
With your permission, I would like to meet with the selected 
subjects for about 15 minutes at the end of this class one 
week from today. At that time I will explain the project 
in more detail; I will ask you to sign a form consenting to 
participate as a subject in the study, and I will hand out 
some materials which you will use. The two week data 
collection period will begin January 23 and end February 6. 
Are there any questions? 
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Questions regarding what was expected in the reports were answered 
in a non-directive, open-ended fashion. Subjects were advised to report 
or not report whatever they felt was appropriate within the bounds of 
the experiment and that these bounds would be explained in greater detail 
later. 
Thirty-two women completed questionnaires. Individuals who 
remembered having dreamed less than twice during the past two weeks, did 
not recall dreams "at all" clearly, or were "not at all" interested in 
dreams or in participating in the project were not selected. After 
selection, the experimenter met with the PSA and PW subject groups 
separately. They were told that the purpose of the study was to 
evaluate and analyze written accounts of dreams and waking experiences. 
They were reminded that their reports would remain anonymous and told 
that the project would be explained in detail after the reports were 
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returned to the experimenter. Subjects then signed the Informed Consent 
Form (Appendix B). 
Each subject received a 10 by 12 inch envelope containing 50 sheets 
of eight and one-half by eleven inch, white, ruled, writing paper; 28 
four by nine and one-half inch, white envelopes; a black ink, ball point 
pen; and an instruction sheet (Appendix C). The larger envelopes were 
stamped with the subject's number, one through nineteen, in the upper 
right hand corner. The smaller envelopes in each packet had this same 
number stamped in the upper right hand corner and a date stamped in the 
upper left hand corner. The dates ran consecutively from January 23, 
1983 to February 6, 1983. For all subjects, one envelope for each date, 
except the last, February 6, 1983, had the notation "P .M.: SIGNIFIC.Ai.""IT 
EXPERIENCES, PAST 4 HOURS" stamped after the date. Beginning January 
24, 1983 and every second day thereaft~r, even numbered subjects 
received one envelope with "A.M.: DREAMS" stamped after the date. 
These same subjects had one envelope for every other day beginning 
January 25, 1983 which was stamped "A.M.: SIGNIFICANT EXPERIENCES, 
LAST 4 HOURS YESTERDAY" following the date. This pattern was reversed 
for odd numbered subjects with the latter notation beginning on January 
24, 1983 and every other day thereafter, and "A.M.: DREAMS" beginning 
on January 25, 1983 and alternate mornings. January 23 had no "A.M." 
reports envelope, and February 6 had no "P.M." reports envelope. 
The experimenter went over the packet materials, read and discus-
sed the intructions sheet, and answered questions with the subject 
groups from the two classes separately. 
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The report process, as outlined in the instruction sheet, pro-
ceeded as follows: All subjects started recording on January 23, 1983. 
Each day for 14 consecutive days, within one-half hour before going to 
sleep, each subject was to write about her experiences during the 
preceding four hours of that day. During this same period of time, 
within one-half hour after waking up every other day, beginning 
January 24, 1983, even numbered subjects described any dreams which 
came to mind from the previous night. After awakening on alternate 
days, those same subjects again described their experiences during the 
last four hours of the preceding evening. Odd numbered subjects 
followed the same format except that they wrote about dreams after 
awakening every other day beginning January 25, 1983 and described the 
previous evening's events on alternate mornings. Figure 1 diagrans 
the report process for odd and even nu~bered subjects. The subjects 
recorded the date, time, and their number at the beginning of each report. 
When completed, each report was to be sealed in its envelope and 
the envelope returned to the packet. If subjects complied with this 
requirement, they were unable to reread or change completed reports. 
Reports and other materials were collected from the PSA subjects 
on February 7, 1983 and the PW subjects on February 8, 1983. Two PSA 
subjects, numbers three and five, and seven PW subjects, numbers 11, 12, 
13, 14, 16, 18, and 19, turned in complete sets of reports. These 
subjects were paid and the project and its purpose were explained in 
detail immediately after the materials were returned to the experi-
menter. 
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Each written report was assigned a four digit number for identi-
fication. The first two digits were the subject's number and the second 
two the sequential number of the particular report starting with the first 
evening report as number 01. For example, subject number three's 
reports were numbered: 0301, 0302, 0303, etc. 
All reports from all subjects were then compiled in a semi-
randomized order in a three ring binder. They were typed, double-spaced, 
on eight and one-half inch, white, typing paper with the appropriate 
identification number double-spaced immediately above each report at the 
left hand margin. The reports were typed verbatim as written by the 
subject. No report was modified, corrected, or changed in any way from 
its original form. When the handwriting was illegible, the typist 
placed an ellipsis of three periods in parentheses. 
Scoring. The typed reports were scored for the five classes of 
emotions and according to the standards described by Hall and Van de 
Castle (1966, pp. 110-114) for "The Classification and Scoring of 
Emotions" in dream reports. These classes include: anger, apprehension, 
happiness, sadness, and confusion. The salient aspects of each class 
are discussed along with some representative terms, scoring procedures, 
and examples. Emotions are scored when specific words connoting emotion, 
often verbs and adjectives, occur in a dream report. Emotions may be 
scored for the dreamer and other dream characters. This convention was 
followed in the present study; but in keeping with its primary focus, 
the emotions expressed by all characters were combined for each class 
and for all emotions together in the data analysis reported. Differences 
in intensity of emotion are not identified in the scale. 
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Hall and Van de Castle define dreams as "that which a person 
reports when he is asked to relate a dream, excluding statements which 
are comments on or interpretations of the dream" (p. 18). Norms were 
developed from 1,000 dream reports, five of which were submitted by 
each of 100 female and 100 male undergraduate college students as an 
assigned class project. These were "home" or nonlaboratory dreams. No 
dream was less than 50 or more than 300 words in length. Subject's 
ages ranged from 18 to 25. 
Scorer reliability for two judges was assessed using 100 dreams. 
Total emotions scored were 78 and 70 respectively. For specific classes 
of emotions, total ranged from 27 to 20 (apprehension) to 13 and 13 
(happiness) for the two judges. The interrater correlation for numbers 
of emotions scored over groups of 10 dreams was .76 (p. 155). 
In a contemporary review of dream measurement scales, Winget and 
Kramer (1979) cite eight studies between 1968 and 1972 whfrh used this 
sytem. One, Sandler, Kramer, Trinder, and Fishbein (1970), assessed 
interrater reliability and found consistent rater disagreement as if 
the raters were "operating under different assumptions" (Winget & 
Kramer, p. 38). 
In the present study, two female graduate students at Portland 
State University were paid $100 each to score the reports. Before 
seeing the data, they studied the scoring procedures outlined in 
Chapter 10 and Appendix B of Hall and Van de Castle (1966). They also 
practiced scoring on dreams related in Cartwright (1977). 
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Both raters received the following items bound in identical three 
ring binders: (1) a swmnary list of Hall and Van de Castle's scoring 
criteria (Appendix D), (2) some "Notes for Scorers" (Appendix E), 
(3) tally sheets for scoring emotions (Appendix F), and (4) copies of 
the typed reports in the same semi-randomized order. The scorers 
entered the report number and a tally mark in the appropriate block on 
the tally sheet for each instance of emotion which she identified. All 
scoring materials were returned to the experimenter during the first 
week of April 1983. 
The experimenter compiled the ratings by subject-report number and 
counted the words in each report. When dream reports contained more 
than one dream, the frequency counts of words and emotions for all 
dreams together were used. 
Hall and Van de Castle suggest that since frequencies of some 
"experiences will depend, to some degree, on the length of the dream 
••• [events] should be computed for dreams of equal length or for 
frequencies per words of the dream text (rates)" (p. 13). At the 
same time, since Pearson's r comparisons of frequencies·of emotions 
with words of report in the present data are small, !. = .543, .E. (0.000, 
for rater A and!.= .506, .E_(0.000, for rater B, frequencies of emotions 
may not be related to report length. Hence, data analysis are expressed 
in terms of both frequencies and rates whenever appropriate. In this 
study, "rate" indicates the frequency count of a given class of emotions 
or all classes of emotions per 100 words of a given report. 
RESULTS 
Raters 
Table I summarizes the raters' data over all!!_= 252 reports and 
gives Pearson's r values for interrater correlations on respective 
parameters. A t-test of the difference in the mean numbers of emotions 
scored per report for the two raters over all reports reveals that 
rater B identified significantly more emotions than did rater A: mean 
difference= -0.119, standard deviation= 0.784, .!. = -2.41, p (0.017. 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF FREQUENCY COUNTS FOR f IVE CLASSES OF EMOTIONS 
AND TOTAL EMOTIONS FOR N = 252 REPORTS AND 
PEARSON'S r VALUES-FOR TWO RATERS 
RATER A RATER B 
57 
EMOTION FREgUENCY MEAN SD FREgUENCY MEAN SD PEARSON'S r* 
ANGER 38 0.151 0.439 35 0.139 0.410 0.770 
APPREHENSION 62 0.246 0.531 63 0.250 0.494 0.813 
CONFUSION 31 0.123 0.405 38 0.151 0.490 0.709 
HAPPINESS 104 0.413 0.734 134 0.532 0.885 0.765 
SADNESS 37 0.147 0.453 32 0.127 0.409 0.781 
ALL 272 1.079 1.423 302 1.198 1.510 0.859 
*Probability ..E. = 0 is 0.000 in all cases. 
Table II, which will be discussed later, gives the nonsignif icant 
results and significant .!. values at a chance p ( 0.05 for correlated means 
t-tests of the difference in mean frequencies and rates of emotions 
comparing evening with subsequent morning reports for all subjects and 
both raters. Phi coefficients computed where significant t values 
equal 0 and nonsignificant values equal 1 in Table II, comparing rater 
A with rater B, give phi = 0.438 for frequencies and phi = 0.125 for 
rates of emotions. In other words, rater agreement regarding significant 
!. values for these data are negligible. In addition, if only those 
cases are considered where either one or both raters' t value is 
significant, things go from bad to worse: for frequencies phi = 0.50, 
for rates phi = -1.00. In the first case, the raters disagreed as 
often as not; in the latter, they always disagreed. 
TABLE II 
T- TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN CORRELATED MEAN FREQUENCIES AND RATES 
OF TOTAL EMOTIONS PER REPORT COMPARING TYPE 1 
WITH TYPE 3 AND TYPE 2 WITH TYPE 4 REPORTS 
RATER A RATER B 
FREQUENCY RATE FREQUENCY RATE 
SUBJECT PAIR* T p T p T p T 
3 l.;..3 
3 2-4 
5 1-3 -2.48 0.048 
5 2-4 
11 1-3 2.71 0.035 
p 
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11 2-4 2.44 0.050 
12 1-3 2.52 0.045 
12 2-4 2.90 0.027 
13 1-3 
13 2-4 -3.10 
14 1-3 
14 2-4 
16 1-3 
16 2-4 
18 1-3 
18 2-4 3.29 0.017 4.04 0.007 
19 1-3 
19 2-4 
*Pairs: (1-3) Evening report with next morning's report of prior 
evening's experiences 
(2-4) Evening report with· next morning's report of dreams 
Blank cells indicate t values with chance p > 0. 05. 
All DF = 6 
0.021 
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Reports 
Each of nine subjects returned 28 reports for a total of N = 252. 
Each set of 28 reports included seven of each "type." Figure 1 shows 
the format of the raw data. Table III gives mean word counts for the 
four types of reports and the results of differences in correlated 
means t-tests comparing evening with the following morning's report 
(type 1 versus 3 and type 2 versus 4) and comparing morning reports 
of previous evening's experiences with the next morning's dream reports 
(type 3 versus 4). Mean evening report was significantly longer than 
subsequent morning report of the same experiences. The mean dream 
report was signf iciantly longer than both the preceding evening and 
alternate morning reports. 
TYPE* 
1 
3 
2 
4 
3 
4 
TABLE III 
T-TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN CORRELATED MEAN WORD COUNTS 
COMPARING REPORT TYPES USING DATA FROM ALL SUBJECTS 
MEAN MEAN 
WORDS S.D. DIFFERENCE S.D. T p 
114.73 64.00 
73.38 44.28 41. 35 53.82 6.10 0.000 
119.57 74.68 
171. 75 149.76 -52.17 160.25 -2.58 0.012 
73.38 44.28 
171. 75 149.76 -98.37 155. 91 -5.01 0.000 
D.F. 
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*Report Types: (1) Evening report preceding report of the same 
events the following morning 
(2) Evening report preceding dream report the 
following morning 
(3) Morning Report of the previous evening's events 
(4) Morning report of dreams 
Table II presents the crux of findings as far as differences in 
numbers of emotions in evening versus morning reports are concerned. 
T-tests were calculated to identify significant differences in mean total 
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frequencies and rates of emotions between type 1 versus 3 and type 2 
versus 4 reports for each subject. The resulting two sets of 18 
comparisons for each rater include only four significant differences in 
each set for a total of eight significant findings. The t value was 
significant for both raters in only one case. In six instances 
evening and in two cases morning reports expressed more emotions. In 
no case were both the frequency and rate t values different from the 
chance level. 
In order to tell if a given class of emotions was identified 
more often in evening or morning reports, and hence that one or the 
other was more emotionally dysphoric, !_-tests for differences between 
correlated means were evaluated for each class of emotions comparing 
type 1 versus 3 and type 2 versus 4 reports for each subject-rater 
combination and for both frequencies a~d rates of emotions. Of these 
.!!_ = 360 comparisons, four yielded significant!_ values at 12..(0.05. 
These four instances are summarized in Table IV. According to rater B, 
subject 13 expressed more apprehension in dreams than in waking reports 
the previous evening. The raters agree that subject 18 expressed a 
greater incidence of happiness in evening reports than in dream reports 
the following morning. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Rater disagreement is the most apparent Achilles' heel of this 
study. The interrater correlations for frequency counts over each class 
of emotions and all emotions, while modest, may be acceptable. It is 
TABLE IV 
T-TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN CORRELATED MEAN FREQUENCIES OR RATES, WHERE P(.05, FOR FIVE 
CLASSES OF EMOTIONS COMPARING EVENING AND SUBSEQUENT MORNING REPORT TYPES** 
RATE (R)/ MEAN 
RATER s EMOTION TYPE* FREQUENCY (F) N MEAN S.D. DIFFERENCE S.D. T p D.F. 
B 13 APPREHENSION 2 F 0 0 
-0.857 0.690 -3.29 0.017 6 4 F 6 0.857 0.690 
B 13 APPREHENSION 2 R 0 0 
-0.299 0.230 -3.44 0.014 6 4 R 6 0.299 0.230 
A 18 HAPPINESS 2 F 5 o. 714 0.756 0.714 0.756 2.50 0.047 6 4 F 0 0 
A 18 HAPPINESS 2 F 10 1.429 1. 397 1.429 1.397 2. 71 0.035 6 4 F 0 0 
*See Figure 1 for report types 
**P) .05 for all similar comparisons for all subjects and both raters 
0\ 
I-' 
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clear, however, that rater B scored significantly more emotions than did 
rater A. It seems that rater A exercised more stringent, or rater B more 
relaxed standards in identifying an emotion. The phi coefficients show 
a dramatic lack of agreement between the raters with regard to signif i-
cant differences in emotions expressed in evening and morning reports. 
It is impossible to say if these disagreements derive from the Hall and 
Van de Castle scale itself, the manner in which it was employed in the 
present study, or some personal variable related to the particular 
raters. Better agreement may have been,achieved had the raters been 
more extensively trained. While these findings do not necessarily 
parallel Sandler's et al. (1970) contention that their raters operated 
"under different assumptions" (Winget & Kramer, 1979, p. 38), rater 
agreement was a problem in both cases. As a consequence, all data 
analyses are problematic and must be considered with this caveat in mind. 
Different report types differ in mean numbers of words per 
report. Dream reports are longer than both previous evening reports 
and alternate morning reports. Evening reports are longer than reports 
of the same events the following morning. Reporting the prior evening's 
activities a second time was redundant and may have been less interesting 
to the subjects than the other two report types. By the same token, 
dream reports may have been more interesting and hence subjects wrote 
more about them. This greater length, however, does not coincide with 
an increased number of emotions per report. 
In the overwhelming majority of cases, the incidences of total 
emotions and of each specific class of emotions in evening and morning 
reports do not differ. In the very few cases where a difference is 
identified, the two raters almost never agree. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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This study affords very little evidence to support the contention 
that dreams are not continuous with waking experience. The data seem 
to contradict previous assertions (Calkins, 1893; Weed & Hallam, 1896; 
Bentley, 1915; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966; Snyder, 1970; Kramer et al., 
1971; Hartshorn et al., 1977) that dreams express fewer or more un-
pleasant emotions than might be expected. The present design, unlike 
most others, incorporates reports of waking experience as a basis of 
comparison without which the central questions are very difficult to 
evaluate operationally. In the present perspective, hypotheses support-
ing the discontinuity position would have to be discounted for most 
subjects. 
On the other hand, data from subjects 13 and 18 are consistent 
with the argument that dreams express more dysphoric or less pleasant 
emotions. Subject 13 expressed more apprehension in her dream reports 
than in waking experience reports the evening before. Subject 18 often 
described happiness in daytime experiences but never in dreams. The 
fact that significant results of these kind appeared for only two sub-
jects may well reflect findings previosly cited (Starker, 1973, 1974, 
19744; Cohen, 1974; Fisher and Greenberg, 1977; Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 
1964; Foulkes et al., 1966; Vogel et al., 1966; Vogel, 1978) that the 
affective content of dreams and fantasy life is an idiographic matter. 
Some people's fantasies are colorful, others' are not. 
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This study exhibits at least two obvious flaws: the small number 
of subjects and the low degree of interrater agreement. If more sub-
jects had been studied, the findings may have been different. More 
interrater consistency would have placed the results in a much less 
equivocal position. 
To summarize, the vast bulk of the present findings support the 
notion that dreams are essentially continuous with waking experience 
as far as both numbers and kinds of emotions are concerned. There is, 
however, a suggestion that dreams might be less pleasant for some indi-
viduals than are their waking experiences. 
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APPENDIX A 
SLEEP AND DREAM-HABITS QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Adapted from Lehto, 1980) 
Please answer each of the following questions as accurately as you 
can. All of the information you provide will be kept strictly conf iden-
tial. 
Name: 
Last First 
Address: 
Street City 
Phone: Age: 
For each of the following questions, indicate your answer by 
placing a cross (X) in the appropriate blank. 
1. Are you presently using any prescribed medication? 
Yes No 
2. Once you are in bed and ready to sleep, about how many minutes does 
it take you to fall asleep? 
Less than 5 5-10 10-15 15-20 More than 20 
3. About how many hours do you sleep each night? 
Less than 5 5-6 7-8 9-10 More than 10 
4. Do you have a regular bedtime and waking time? 
Yes No 
5. At approximately what time do you usually go to sleep? 
8 PM 9PM lOPM 11 PM 12 AM After 12 AM 
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6. At approximately what time do you usually get up each morn~ng? 
5 AM 6 AM 7 AM 8 AM 9 AM 10 AM 
After 10 AM 
7. During the LAST TWO WEEKS, immediately upon waking up in the morning, 
how of ten do you recall having been dreaming? 
__ every morning 
__ just about every morning 
most mornings of the 
week 
about every other morning 
about two mornings a week 
about one morning a week 
__ once during the two weeks 
not once 
8. During the LAST TWO WEEKS, how often did you record (tape recorded 
or written) the dreams you recalled? 
__ every remembered dream __ every third rememberd dream 
__ just about every 
remembered dream 
__ every fifth remembered dream 
__ every other remembered 
dream 
9. How clearly do you remember your dreams? 
not at all a few parts 
one remembered dream 
not one dream 
__ many parts 
__ most parts __ in great detail 
10. How interested are you in dreams? 
not at all a little moderately extremely 
11. How interested are you in participating in this dream research 
project? 
not at all a little moderately __ extremely 
12. If there is anything else you would like to tell me about your 
dreams and/or dream.~ng habits, please feel free to do so here: 
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APPENDIX B 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM (P_age 1 of 2) 
I, 
as a subject in the research project on written reports of waking experi-
ences and dreams conducted by Dean Conklin, graduate student in 
Psychology. 
I understand that the study involves writing down my significant 
waking experiences and dreams each morning and evening for 15 consecutive 
days. I will be asked to honestly report these waking experiences and 
dreams. I will not be required to disclose any information which I do 
not wish to. 
It has been explained to me that the purpose of the study is to 
learn something of the relationship between reports of waking experiences 
and dreams. My participation may help to increase knowledge about dreams 
and dreaming. I understand that the study will be explained to me in 
detail after I complete the project. At that time, Dean Conklin will 
answer any questions which I may have about the study. 
I will receive $10.00 (ten dollars) remuneration if I complete 
the project. 
I have been assured that all information which I give will be 
kept confidential and that my identity as a subject in this study 
will remain anonymous after the project is finished. 
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I understand that I am free to withdraw from participation in this 
study at any time without jeopardizing my relationship with Portland 
State University. 
I have read and understand the foregoing information. 
Date: 
If you experience problems that are the result of your participation in 
this study, please contact Victor C. Dahl, Office of Graduate Studies 
and research, 105 Neuberger Hall, Portland State University, 229-3423. 
APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS 
This project will begin the evening of January 23, 1983 and will 
continue for 15 consecutive days until the morning of February 6, 1983. 
During this period, each day within one-half hour before going to sleep, 
please tell me about the significant experiences you have had during the 
preceding four hours. Within one-half hour after waking up on even 
numbered days, please tell me about your dreams that night. Within 
one-half hour after waking up on odd numbered days, please tell me about 
the significant experiences you described the previous evening. 
Begin each report with the date, time, and your number. Report, 
in your own words, whatever comes to mind. If there are matters which 
you would rather not talk about, do not, but try to be as open and 
spontaneous as possible. Remember no one will know who wrote any report. 
Do not edit or rewrite. Write legibly but do not be overly concerned 
with mechanics such as spelling, punctuation, or grannnar. Do not use 
names. Refer to people by their first initial only. Your envelope 
contains a pen, writing paper, and an envelope for each report with the 
date, the letters "AM" for a morning or "PM" for an evening report, the 
report topic, and your number printed at the top. When you finish a 
report, fold it, seal it in the appropriate envelope, and return the 
envelope to your packet. 
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If you have questions call me at 656-4523 after 6:00 PM. Please 
do not discuss the study with anyone before you return your reports to 
me on February 8, 1983. I will explain the study to you in more detail 
at that time. After that you may discuss it with anyone if you choose 
to. 
APPENDIX D 
SCORING CRITERIA SUMMARY 
Hall and Van de Castle Scale for Emotions 
Anger (AN) 
Words reflecting anger: 
annoyed 
irritated 
mad 
provoked 
furious 
enraged 
belligerent 
incensed 
indignant 
Apprehension (AP) 
Apprehension reflects discomfort because of potential danger from 
physical injury, punishment, ridicule, rejection, etc., emotions 
relate to fear, anxiety, guilt, embarrassment. 
Words reflecting apprehension: 
terrified 
horrified 
frightened 
scared 
worried 
nervous 
concerned 
panicky 
alarmed 
uneasy 
upset 
remorseful 
sorry 
apologetic 
regretful 
ashamed 
Happiness (HA) 
A general state of pleasant feeling tone. 
Words reflecting happiness: 
contented 
pleased 
relieved 
amused 
cheerful 
glad 
relaxed 
gratified 
gay 
wonderful 
elated 
joyful 
exhilarated 
Sadness (SD) 
Unhappy emotional states, not physical pain or distress. 
Words reflecting sadness: 
disappointed 
distressed 
hurt 
depressed 
lonely 
lost 
miserable 
hopeless 
crushed 
heartbroken 
Confusion (CO) 
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Cognitive ambiguity shading toward free-floating anxiety, frustration, 
depression--generally produced through confrontation with unexpected 
events, or inability to choose between alternatives. 
Words reflecting confusion: 
surprised 
astonished 
amazed 
awestruck 
mystified 
puzzled 
perplexed 
(Words reflecting confusion continued): 
strange 
bewildered 
doubtful 
conflicted 
undecided 
uncertain 
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Generally, do not infer emotions from actions or settings. Emotions are 
usually expressed by the dreamer. Physical pain or distress is not an 
emotion. 
APPENDIX E 
NOTES FOR SCORERS 
1. The reports are typed as written by the subjects. Typist was 
instructued not to correct anything, ( .•. ) or (?) indicate typist 
could not read a word, (word?) indicates was not sure of word and 
guessed at it. 
2. Some reports contain more than one dream. Score each separately. 
On tally sheet indicate different dreams within a report by letters 
"A,B,C," etc. (1425A, 1425B, etc.) 
3. Do not score introductions to, explanations of, or interpretations 
of dreams. Example: "I was mad at J when I went to bed" is not 
scored for a dream report. 
4. Potential problem areas: 
"We were happy." Score for each individual if they are apparent, 
otherwise score for dreamer and other. 
"I laughed." Would be scored as happiness. 
"We had dinner out. It was wonderful." ? ? 
"I was surprised and pleased." What emotions? 
"I felt pain and anger." What is "pain"? 
"I was almost sad." ? ? 
APPENDIX F 
TALLY SHEET FOR SCORING EMOTIONS 
Report No. Total Words (W) Frequency Count (F) 
Anger Aoorehension Confusion Happiness Sadness 
F F/W F F/W F F/W F F/W F F/W 
Dreamer 
Other 
Females 
Males 
Others 
Total 
